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Introduction
Three words can be used to characterize the intended functionality of the United States
government: We the People. These words are central to the foundation of our institutions, and
more broadly our democracy. Our government is classified as a representative democracy, which
means that citizens elect representatives to create laws and policies on their behalf. We the
People elect individuals to represent us in every governing body of our country, from the office
of the presidency and seats in the United States Congress, to local representatives on our town
and school boards. When representatives work to advocate for the benefit of the people, our
democracy works well. When the people feel strongly that there ought to be a law put in place or
specific policy created, they reach out to their elected official, who then writes that bill or policy,
and introduces it to the larger governing body to be voted on for approval or disapproval. If the
bill is approved, it becomes a law and is implemented. It is also the responsibility of the
governing body and our representatives to ensure that policies enacted are implemented fairly
and respond to the will of the people, rather than the requests and influence of special interest
groups with more selfish motivations. In an ideal world, the United States’ representative
democracy would work as it has been described above, it has in the past, and sometimes it still
does now. However, often our representatives are influenced by other, wealthier, more powerful
factors that affect policy and decision making, that often stand in opposition to the will of the
people.
The United States has entered an age of extreme inequality. While inequality is not a new
phenomenon in the United States, it has been exacerbated over the past 50 years as the wealthiest
Americans and large financial and corporate interests have amassed previously unimaginable
levels of wealth and influence. The income and wealth gap between the rich and the working
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class has been rapidly increasing. Simultaneously, opportunities for upward class mobility are
declining. The richest 0.1 percent of Americans now hold approximately the same amount of
wealth as the entire bottom 90 percent of the population. The access and influence that the 0.1
percent has on our policy and decision making processes in government are what places our
democracy in peril. Most often, wealthy, powerful individuals and groups pursue political aims
that secure and enhance their wealth and power and are consequently at odds with the broader
interests of the American people and American society. Therefore, as the influence and power of
the wealthy continues to grow and affect the decision making of our elected representatives, our
form of government moves further and further away from democracy and toward plutocracy, or a
government ruled by the wealthy.
At the time of this writing, the American people have not been in such dire need of
government help since the Great Depression. On March 11, 2020 the World Health Organization
officially declared COVID-19 (coronavirus/COVID) a pandemic. COVID-19 is caused by a
coronavirus called SARS-CoV-2, and can infect different individuals with a range of effects from
no symptoms at all to severe illness and even death. The coronavirus spreads rapidly and
aggressively, which is why it has had such a detrimental effect on our society over the last year
and so quickly took over our lives. COVID-19 has taken millions of lives worldwide, put
millions out of work and has decimated the global economy. Since January 2020, there have
been over 141,754,944 confirmed cases of coronavirus and 3,025,835 deaths worldwide. From
those statistics, there have been 31,350,025 confirmed cases and 561,921 deaths in the United
States alone.1 In addition to creating a public health crisis, the coronavirus pandemic has created
an economic crisis with increases in unemployment, evictions, and poverty rates. The health and

1

"United States of America: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard With Vaccination Data," World
Health Organization, accessed April 21, 2021, https://covid19.who.int/region/amro/country/us)
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socioeconomic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic are prevalent throughout the entire country. The
American people are hurting, physically and economically. As one would expect in a
representative democracy, the people look to the government, their elected representatives, for
understanding of their difficult positions and, more importantly, relief.
This paper assesses the COVID-19 relief response of the federal government. How well
was the response created and implemented to satisfy the demonstrated needs of the majority of
the people? If the relief response of the federal government did not address the needs of the
majority of the people, why did that happen? Who benefited instead? To answer these questions
we will examine and analyze a case study of the implementation of the Paycheck Protection
Program, which was created under the S.3548 - CARES Act passed by the Senate to provide
relief to small businesses across the United States.
Research, examination, and analysis of the creation and implementation of the Paycheck
Protection Program finds that the federal COVID-19 relief response of the federal government
did not satisfy the needs of the American people and was the result of off center policymaking.
Despite clearly demonstrated preferences of a bipartisan majority of Americans for how, when,
and to whom relief should be distributed, the federal government’s COVID relief plans and
policies were skewed to benefit the interests of wealthy corporations and America’s wealthiest
citizens. Until the 2020 election, which gave Democrats control of all three branches of
government, Republicans - specifically President Donald Trump, Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell, and Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin- were largely in control of the federal
government’s COVID-19 relief response. Republican control of the Senate, the Presidency, and
consequently key offices in the executive branch gave the political upperhand to the GOP in
agenda setting, policy negotiations, and implementation of economic relief policy. Although the
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Democratic party has not always best represented the will of the people, the Republican party has
a long history of implementing unpopular policies that work to benefit large corporations and the
wealthiest 1 percent of Americans at the expense of the interests of the majority of Americans,
including their own constituents. The research and analysis in this paper find that members of the
Republican party implemented unpopular policies under the guise of relief packages that they
asserted would help the majority of people and were created in direct response to the
demonstrated needs of the people. However, when these policies were implemented, the actual
intentions of our Republican led federal government to benefit large corporations, already
wealthy industries, and the 1 percent were revealed.

Literature Review
Levels of inequality in the United States are rapidly rising and the implications are dire
for low-income individuals. Income and wealth generated by productivity growth and gross
domestic product increasingly flow to those at the top of the economic ladder, thus resulting in
dramatically fewer resources for everyone else. In recent years, America’s top 1 percent of
earners experienced rapid income growth, while there has been little to no income growth for
everyone else. As shown in Figure 1, the income of the top 1 percent is quickly rising, while that
of the bottom 50 percent is on a sharp decline. In fact, the percent of income earned by the top 1
percent nearly doubled over the last 40 years. In 1980, 11 percent of national income was
received by the top 1 percent wealthiest Americans. In 2016 they received 20 percent of the
national income.2 In addition to income growth, there has also been a rapid increase in capital
income among the 1 percent, further widening the wealth gap between the rich and the rest of the

2

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Let Them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality
(New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2020), 46)
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American population which does not have the luxury of extensive investment portfolios.3
Though the American Dream remains prominent in the American ethos, the chances of achieving
upward social and economic mobility are slim for those who are brought up in low income
households. Children of lower income families are very likely to remain poor for their lifetimes
as they do not have access to adequate resources and education to thrive. Conversely, children of
higher income families are disproportionately likely to remain well off because they do have
access to these resources.4 These inequalities are further exacerbated for Black Americans,
which, in turn, increases inequality among racial groups.
Our country was founded upon the ideals of responsive government and equal
citizenship. Exponentially rising levels of income, wealth, mobility, and racial inequalities work
directly against our democratic ideals, thus stalling American progress. While we will likely
never achieve perfect levels of equality and harmony in the United States, the widening of these
disparities is not inevitable. There is widespread scholarly recognition that American politics and
policy making is over representative of the interests of the wealthy at the expense of the interests
of average citizens, thus worsening and perpetuating socioeconomic inequality in the US.
Literature on this topic finds worrisome trends in citizen voice, government decision making,
and public policy that create and maintain these inequalities. These studies find that government
institutions are more responsive to the privileged, and government programs and policies lack the
funding and ability to promote equal opportunity and security and enhance citizen dignity and

3

Derek Thompson, "A Giant Statistical Round-Up of the Income Inequality Crisis in 16 Charts," The Atlantic,
December 13, 2012, accessed April 21, 2021,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/a-giant-statistical-round-up-of-the-income-inequality-crisis-in
-16-charts/266074/)
4
Michael Greenstone et al., "Thirteen Economic Facts about Social Mobility and the Role of Education," Brookings,
November 18, 2016, accessed April 21, 2021,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/thirteen-economic-facts-about-social-mobility-and-the-role-of-education/)
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participation.5 Over the years, inequality has deepened because American politics is not focused
on the needs and desires of the average voter. Instead, politics is centered around and influenced
by the voices of organized, well-funded, corporate backed groups that pressure elected officials
to produce legislation that supports their plutocratic interests. Literature finds that via large
contributions, wealthy citizens and moneyed interests gain influence over who runs for office,
and have greater access to government officials once they are elected into office.6 In fact,
government officials who design policy changes are more than twice as responsive to the
preferences of the rich as to the preferences of the least affluent, and the rich have greater
leverage when their preferences diverge substantially from the preferences of the poor.7
Therefore, policies created, enacted, and implemented by elected officials influenced by the
wealthy are designed to address the interests of this minority, rather than addressing the interests
of the ordinary voter.
We can use a policy centered perspective to examine the relationship between policy and
politics, by observing policy as a means by which elected officials achieve political goals, shape
political interchange, and convey status and identity.8 Since the 1970s, the central focus of
American policy changes have become the reduction of taxes and government spending,
ultimately benefiting the wealthy. This shift in focus is largely due to a political tactic known as
“policy drift”9 and is also the result of a combination of factors such as the decline of unions, the
5

Lawrence Jacobs et al., "American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality," The American Political Science
Association, 2004, 5)
6
Ibid, 14.
7
Ibid.
8
Joe Soss, Jacob S. Hacker, and Suzanne Mettler, Remaking America: Democracy and Public Policy in and Age of
Inequality (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007), 2-32)
9
Drift….is the passive aggressive form of politics….[Drift] has two stages. First, large economic and social
transformations outflank or erode existing policies, diminishing their role in American life. Then, political leaders
fail to update policies, diminishing their role in American life. Then, political leaders fail to update policies, even
when there are viable options, because they face pressure from powerful interests exploiting opportunities for
political obstruction. (Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-take-all Politics: How Washington Made the Rich
Richer-and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon & Schustser, 2011), 53)
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deterioration of the American welfare state, incited and perpetuated by the rise of an aggressive,
well organized, politically powerful conservative movement. Unions were targeted by
proponents of big business because when unions are strong, benefits and wages for workers are
higher, thus limiting the profits for the owners of the businesses. As unions declined, businesses
became even more powerful. Therefore they paid less for labor and economic inequality
consequently increased. With the decline of unions, workers lost their economic and political
clout and our political system became biased to support the interests of business managers. In
turn, business leaders no longer needed to accede to workers’ demands for higher wages and
better benefits, and instead focused on maximizing profits. This, in turn, has allowed business
leaders to increase donations to political campaigns and initiatives that support their pro-business
goals, and have greater influence on the creation and implementation of policies that will
ultimately further their profits.
Literature also finds that policy drift has contributed to the deterioration of the American
welfare state as key social benefits and regulatory policies have not kept up with the pace of the
rising costs of critical goods and services.10 Social programs that benefit the disadvantaged can
only function if policy makers allocate enough funding and other means to support them. When
policy makers fail to take these actions, social programs, such as Benefit to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, that many depend on are diminished. As programs that disadvantaged
Americans depend on wither away, inequality between the rich and the poor naturally increases.
Again, the widening of the gap between America's wealthy and ordinary citizens is a direct result
of the inaction of our policy makers.

10

Joe Soss, Jacob S. Hacker, and Suzanne Mettler, Remaking America: Democracy and Public Policy in and Age of
Inequality (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007), 2-32)
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Although our political system and many of our elected politicians tolerate inequality,
most Americans desire a system with more economic equality and support egalitarian values. A
survey conducted by Larry Bartels, Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions and Shayne Chair in Public Policy and Social Science at Vanderbilt University, finds
that the overwhelming majority of Americans (85 percent) agree with the statement that, “Our
society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to
succeed.”11 One can infer based on knowledge of a partisan political climate that the 85 percent
of Americans who agreed with this broad statement would likely have differing opinions on
which specific policies should or should not be implemented to achieve equality of opportunity.
However, Americans, regardless of political party identification, possess similar normative
standards about equality. Bartels also finds that the average difference in support for egalitarian
values between strong Republicans and strong Democrats amounts to one-tenth of the overall
scale.12 Because the United States is a representative democracy, one might assume that because
public opinion indicates overwhelming support for egalitarian values and a more equal
distribution of wealth, policies enacted by a large majority of representatives on both sides of the
aisle would reflect this desire for economic equality. This, however, is not the case.
Despite the clear expression of egalitarian values from a bipartisan majority of American
citizens, policy making most often has not reflected these values. The decline of unions, the
deterioration of the welfare state, and an influx of corporate money in politics has led to the
systemic weakening of institutional bonds that are supposed to connect ordinary voters with their
elected representatives. The interests of moneyed elites and large corporations have become the
priority. It is here that the phenomenon that plagues American politics is revealed: off center
11

Larry M. Bartels. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. New York, NY:
Russell Sage Foundation. Pp.127-61.
12
Ibid.
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policy making. Off center policy making is characterized by economic and political elites
increasingly pulling American government away from the influence of its citizens, which results
in policy that starkly and repeatedly departs from the center of public opinion.13 The reason for
off-center policymaking is that political elites have been using their knowledge of public opinion
to “blunt the tools that citizens use to hold them to account” rather than actually respond to their
wishes and concerns. These conditions are made possible by a rising incumbency advantage, the
growing importance of money in the electoral arena, the growing inequality of resources and
organization between the rich and everyone else, and the deliberate efforts of political elites to
manage and distort information in ways that undermine the sway of ordinary voters. Rather than
working to satisfy the wishes and concerns of ordinary voters, off center policymaking allows for
representatives to circumvent their duties to respond to majority public opinion so that they are
able to create politics that satisfy the wishes and concerns of a wealthy minority of voters with,
most often, unpopular interests.
One of the most prominent examples of off center policy making in American history
was the creation and implementation of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001, otherwise known as the “Bush tax cuts” and the subsequent policy fixation of
Republicans in Congress on cutting taxes, regardless of public opinion preferences that often
prioritize other policies. In their book, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of
American Democracy, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson find that the tax policy was pulled
radically off center by the interaction of the increasing incentives of political elites to cater to
their partisan and ideological base, and the increasing capacity of politicians to escape political

13

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American
Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005)
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retribution.14 Despite public opinion, which indicated that tax cuts were a low priority policy,
advocates of the tax cuts and Republican leaders in Congress enacted them anyway and faced
little to no electoral backlash from the people. Proponents of these tax cuts in Congress were able
to get away with creating and implementing a policy that went directly against public preference.
To do this, they employed the same strategies used in all off center policy making: appealing to
wealthy campaign donors, using specifically crafted talk to “sell” the policy to constituents, off
center program design, and policy drift.
Today’s conservative politicians have enhanced incentives to cater to their base as the
rising ideological unity of districts and increasingly sophisticated gerrymandering laws have
increased the importance of and competition in primaries. Therefore, campaign money and major
campaign donors, which disproportionately flow from the affluent and ideologically extreme,
have become much more important in these competitive races. In the case of the Bush Tax cuts,
millions of dollars were funneled from wealthy Republican supporting donors to fund
conservative anti-tax candidates.15 Rather than targeting Democratic candidates, these donors
targeted campaign donations to Republican primaries. This tactic was used to target incumbent
Republicans who were more moderate and less staunchly anti-tax. Therefore to remain in office
Republican incumbents had to shift their ideology further to the right and adopt an anti-tax
position, or else they faced the risk of being primaried by a newer, more conservative, candidate
with more campaign funds supplied by anti-tax wealthy donors. This influx of campaign funds
with anti-tax strings attached eliminated nearly every Republican member of Congress who
opposed tax cuts, thus unifying the party’s policy goals to please their wealthy base. At the end
of each of their terms, to be reelected and keep campaign money flowing from these donors,
14

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, "Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic
Control," Perspectives on Politics: American Political Science Association, 1st ser., 3 (March 2005): 33)
15
Ibid, 40.
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these Republicans must continue appealing to their conservative, anti-tax, wealthy base.
Therefore, despite public preference, Republicans prioritized the anti-tax policymaking with the
Bush tax cuts, thus ultimately engaging in off center policymaking by appealing to the interests
of a small group of wealthy donors rather than the prevailing opinion and interests of the people.
More recently, Steve Bannon, a famously right-wing populist figure and former chief strategist to
Donald Trump spoke on the necessity of working to satisfy the interests of wealthy donors, even
if it goes against public opinion and personal, in his case populist, morals. He said, “The
Kochs16 are a hundred percent with you, so long as it means cutting taxes for the Kochs.
Anything that will help the middle class people? Forget it.”17
Another aspect of off center policymaking that is used to “sell” unpopular policy or
convince the public that policy that benefits the wealthy actually benefits the people is “crafted
talk.”18 Literature describes politicians’ use of crafted talk as a way to simulate responsiveness to
the public’s demonstrated policy preferences. Politicians use crafted talk to slowly influence
public opinion by appearing to respond to the interests of the public while they actually pursue
the desired policy goals of their wealthy supporters, therefore actually moving public opinion
closer to their own desired policy goals. Republicans used crafted talk to help move public
opinion by using misleading language such as overstating the surplus to describe the
distributional effects as working to benefit the people, rather than corporations.19
Policy design is also central to off center policymaking as the distribution and
implementation of specific provisions help to skew the benefits of specific policies to a wealthy
16

The Koch brothers are billionaire conservative donors who are famous for their influence in policy making.
Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Let Them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality
(New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2020), 155)
18
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "An Excerpt from Politicians Don't Pander:Political Manipulation and
the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness," Jacobs & Shapiro, Politicians Don't Pander, Excerpt, accessed April 21,
2021, https://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/389839.html)
19
Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, "Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic
Control," Perspectives on Politics: American Political Science Association, 1st ser., 3 (March 2005): 43)
17
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minority at the expense of the interests of the majority of the people. In the case of the Bush tax
cuts, architects of the policy used tax policy design features such as phase ins, sunsets, and time
bombs that worked to “give the 2001 tax cuts the most attractive public face possible in the short
run, while structuring political agendas in the future”20 and satisfying the interests of wealthy
donors in the long run.
Additionally, elected officials who facilitate and engage in off center policy making often
use political inaction as a tool of accomplishing their goals. Agenda setters in Congress will
practice policy drift by putting off policy debates and hearings to ensure that certain policies that
would hurt the rich and subsequently benefit the middle class do not pass. As previously
discussed, policy drift is also used to chip away at the American welfare state. As funding and
maintenance of social programs are not kept up, the proper functioning of these programs is
hindered. Americans that depend on these programs are then placed at a disadvantage, thus
furthering inequality. Conversely, the money not used for funding of these neglected social
programs can be used for policies that work to benefit the wealthy, such as tax cuts.
The response of the United States government to the coronavirus pandemic is an
extension of the off center policymaking described by other authors cited in this literature review.
The coronavirus pandemic can be interpreted as a natural disaster. Despite the disease itself
being a natural phenomenon, the disproportionate health and socioeconomic effects the virus has
had on low income people and people of color are entirely unnatural. Robert Bullard, famously
known as the “father of environmental justice,” studies how natural disasters wreak havoc on
society unequally.21 Bullard’s work researches how low-income communities of color most often

20

Ibid, 46.
Amal Ahmed, "The “Father of Environmental Justice” on Why He Isn’t Surprised by COVID-19 Health
Disparities," Texas Monthly, April 17, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021,
https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/father-environmental-justice-coronavirus/)
21
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have far fewer resources to address disaster and, as a result, face far greater risks than whiter,
wealthier neighborhoods in times of crisis.22 The disproportionate effects of the coronavirus
pandemic and the reasons for these effects are no different than that of the environmental natural
disasters that Bullard studies. The impacts of environmental natural disasters and the coronavirus
pandemic are worsened for low income communities and people of color because of specific
policy choices enacted by our representatives that limit funding and other resources necessary to
recover from disaster.
In the case of the coronavirus pandemic, the public demonstrated clear needs and
preferences about how the federal government could provide coronavirus relief. Despite public
opinion, elected officials pursued policies that ignored the people, and instead pursued policies
that benefited economic elites rather than those who were suffering. Like the Bush tax cuts, the
federal response to the coronavirus pandemic was the result of off center policy making,
designed to benefit a small group of wealthy elites at the expense of the health and economic
security of the people.

Off Center Policy Making
Off center policymaking is the creation and implementation of policy that works to
answer the demands of small special interest groups and the wealthy rather than addressing the
needs of the greater American public. The mechanisms used by policymakers to create off center
policies can be divided into three categories: crafted talk, skewed policy design and
implementation, and political inaction.
Crafted talk is how our elected officials and other leaders in government portray the
“intent” of a specific off center policy so that it is more palatable to the public, while it is
22

Ibid.
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actually working to benefit a wealthy minority. Government officials trying to pass off center
policies use crafted talk to present the policy under the guise of it working to benefit the people.
An example of crafted talk could be a Republican introducing a policy that, when spoken about
seems to benefit the ordinary American, but in practice, benefits a very small group of
individuals. If a Democrat were to object to this policy, the Republican member in question
would accuse the Democrat of political manipulation and maneuvering at the expense of the
“hardworking” American public, when in reality in this case is that the Republican policy does
nothing to address the needs of the hardworking people the member was speaking so
passionately about.
The second mechanism of off center policymaking is skewed policy design and
implementation. Government officials that enact off center policies strategically design and
implement policies that hide the disproportionate benefits provided to the wealthy and/or a
special interest group in addition to hiding the costs that this policy will have on average voters.
One of the most prominent examples of skewed policy design and implementation was the
backloaded benefits of the Bush tax cuts discussed in the literature review, that made it seem as if
average voters were the main recipient of benefits when really the policy design included tax
phase-ins, sunsets, and time bombs that worked to skew the benefits of the program to America’s
wealthy.
The third mechanism of federal off center policymaking is political inaction on the part of
Congress and members of the Executive Branch. Members of Congress and government officials
in key positions use tactics such as policy drift and policy erosion to slowly chip away at
programs already implemented to serve the people, and that consequently take away benefits
from key wealthy industries and political donors. Rather than actively working to implement off
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center policies, elected officials often use the tactic of political inaction to subtly skew more
benefits to the wealthy. In addition to policy drift and erosion, political inaction can also take the
form of lack or transparency or the refusal of the federal government to provide oversight into
new programs that have been implemented. A lack of federal transparency and federal oversight
provides more opportunities for policy benefits to be provided to the wealthy via the
implementation process rather than ensuring that the policy is being implemented as outlined and
described by policymakers when they were discussing how the policy was going to work to
benefit the people.

Research Design and Methodology
To conduct an examination and analysis of off center policymaking in the federal
economic response to the COVID-19 crisis, this thesis focuses on a case study of the Paycheck
Protection Program as administered by the United States Treasury and the United States Small
Business Administration. The Paycheck Protection Program was created to provide economic
relief as a provision in the COVID-19 stimulus package, known as S.3548 - CARES Act passed
by the United States Senate in March 2020. As of October 2020, the United States government
had spent over $4 trillion on emergency funding to help the people and the economy of the
United States stay healthy throughout the duration of the coronavirus pandemic. Coronavirus
relief money targeted four main sectors: businesses, individuals, governments, and medicine. As
of October 2020, of the total $4 trillion in relief funding, more than half, or $2.3 trillion, was
allocated to businesses. The largest chunk of the money allocated to the business sector was
distributed via the Paycheck Protection Program with over $670 billion (as of December 2020).
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Since then, this number has risen to upwards of $970 billion.23 In order to understand the
government’s approach to rebuilding the broader economy, we must understand their approach to
aiding small businesses. Because of the amount of money placed into the program, and the
emphasis our representatives have placed on the program in helping small businesses and our
economy, the Paycheck Protection Program can be viewed as the cornerstone of the coronavirus
economic relief response from the federal government. Small businesses were hit hard by the
pandemic. For example, as of July 2020, 43% of small businesses reported that they were forced
to temporarily close because of COVID-19.24 In addition, even if some of the businesses were
able to remain open for a certain period of time, financial fragility loomed, threatening cuts to
payroll and more temporary, or even permanent closures. As shown in the results of a survey
conducted by Alexander Bartik, Marianne Bertrand, Zoe Cullen and Edward Glaser on the
impact of COVID-19 on small businesses, the median business with more than $10,000 in
monthly expenses had only about a two week supply of cash on hand to keep the business
operational.25 Small businesses, however, were not the only entities needing help from the federal
government. Individuals were also suffering, which is the reason for the overwhelming bipartisan
demand for stimulus checks and increased unemployment checks. However, despite these
concerns, leaders in Congress and the executive branch chose to provide businesses with the
largest portion of relief funding in an attempt to keep the economy afloat. The government’s
approach to the Covid crisis was business focused, and required trust in employers to then use
federal funds to keep their business operational while also fairly distributing a portion of the
relief money to their employees who were meant to be kept on payroll. The design of the
23

Peter Whoriskey, Douglas MacMillan, and Jonathan O'Connell, "‘Doomed to Fail’: Why a $4 Trillion Bailout
Couldn’t Revive the American Economy," The Washington Post, October 5, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/coronavirus-bailout-spending/)
24
Alexander W. Bartik et al., "The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business Outcomes and Expectations," The
National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 30 (July 2020): accessed April 20, 2021, doi:10.1073/pnas.2006991117)
25
Ibid.
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program, as well as the discretion provided to banks and loan recipients created ample
opportunity for misuse and misallocation of funds to large corporations and wealthy individuals,
rather than small businesses and their employees. We can study the creation and implementation
of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) that was introduced under the CARES Act which was
later expanded by the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act and by
the subsequent Paycheck Program Flexibility Act of 2020 as a case study to examine and analyze
our research objectives of whether off center policy making shaped and characterized the federal
government’s coronavirus economic relief response.
This thesis examines qualitative and quantitative data on the coronavirus economic relief
response of the federal government. To execute this case study this thesis uses a variety of
secondary sources that reported on the COVID relief policymaking process throughout this
pandemic. Secondary sources used in this thesis include articles from national publications such
as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, as well as more local
publications such as the Miami Herald to understand how the implementation of policy is
affecting Americans on a local level. Additionally, scholarly sources such as papers from the
National Bureau of Economic Research and the University of Chicago provide the basis for the
analysis of off center policy making.
Primary sources such as video clips and transcripts of the policymaking process on on the
Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (CSPAN) as well as press releases from the offices of
federal policy makers and direct quotes from these same government officials were used to
understand the policy goals of the officials cited in this thesis throughout the COVID relief
process.
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The quantitative data used in this thesis is obtained directly from a variety of government
agencies and well known polling publications. Data provided on the disproportionate health and
socioeconomic impact of the coronavirus crisis is directly from the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Additionally,
public opinion data referenced in this thesis is from well-known and established polling
organizations such as the Pew Research Center, Gallup, and The Economist. Other quantitative
data used for the analysis of off center policy making is directly from United States government
organizations such as the Small Business Administration and the United States Department of
the Treasury, which provided some insight into where and how federal relief funds were
distributed by lenders. Additionally, websites such as covidmoneytracker.org helped to keep
track of the funds spent and allocated by the federal government for covid economic relief from
the period of March 2020 to March 2021.

The Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Low Income Individuals and People of Color
Health
Covid has disrupted the life of every American to some extent. In addition to initial
shutdowns and mandatory stay-at-home orders in the spring in 2020, our day to day lives and
what is considered to be “normal” has dramatically changed. Social distancing measures have
been put into place in public locations, many have limited their time out of their homes to a
minimum, millions of Americans have made the difficult transition to working or attending
school remotely, and many have not seen family members in months, among other changes to
stop the spread of the coronavirus. Because of these changes, it is easy to think of COVID as a
natural disaster that is affecting all Americans equally. However, as explained above in the
literature review, the work of Robert Bullard proves that when natural disasters hit, they reveal
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the systemic and institutional inequalities that plague marginalized communities, thus placing
them at a higher risk of being negatively affected by disasters. These vulnerable communities are
the most marginalized in terms of health impacts and socioeconomic impacts. COVID-19 has
highlighted these issues of vulnerability, marginalization and health disparities.26 Bullard himself
has spoken about the coronavirus pandemic as
a heat seeking missile that is targeting the most vulnerable populations, and the
bull’s eye is....the communities that are the poorest, that are the most polluted, that
are the sickest when it comes to comorbidity and the result of this heat-seeking
missile called COVID-19 is a death bomb, and you can see that the elevated
hospitalization and the elevated deaths among African Americans particularly. 27

As described by Bullard, people of color, and Black people specifically, are suffering
disproportionately from the negative health effects of the coronavirus pandemic. It is important
to note that, although the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) requires medical
testing labs to report to state and local public health departments COVID infection data by race,
ethnicity, and gender, many states are not in compliance. As of May 2020, only 51 percent of
total COVID cases and 88 percent of COVID deaths had an identified race.28 However, since
then, 65 percent of new cases have an identified race, and states have been working to identify
the race or previously recorded deaths without an identified race.29
We can examine the disproportionate health impacts of COVID-19 on people of color by
looking at rates of cases/infections, hospitalizations, and deaths. According to data provided by
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the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and as shown in Figure 2, Black
Americans, Latinx Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans are experiencing much
higher rates in all three categories when compared to White Americans. 30 Across all income
groups and geographic locations, Native American, Black, Asian, and Latinx Americans all have
higher rates of infection than white Americans with Native Americans becoming infected at 1.7x
the rate of white Americans. Asian Americans were infected at 0.7x than that of white
Americans. Black Americans were infected at 1.1x rate, and Latinx Americans were infected at
1.3x than that of their white counterparts.31 Additionally, according to studies conducted by the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the American Public Media Research
Lab (APM), in higher poverty US counties, those with substantially non-white populations had
an infection rate nearly eight times that of counties with substantially white populations.32 People
of color are also experiencing higher rates of hospitalizations than whites, with Native
Americans experiencing 3.7x the rate of hospitalizations from COVID as compared to white
Americans. Asian Americans are experiencing hospitalizations at 1.0x the rate, Black Americans
are enduring 2.9x the rate, and Latinx Americans are experiencing 3.1x the rate of
hospitalizations than their white counterparts.33 In addition to higher rates of hospitalizations,
people of color are also experiencing disproportionately high death rates from COVID-19 than
white Americans, while COVID related white deaths are disproportionately low. The death rate
30
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for Native Americans is 2.4x, for Asian Americans 1.0x, for Black Americans 1.9x, and for
Latinx Americans 2.3x the death rate of white Americans. 34 Similarly to infection and
hospitalization rates, these numbers are exacerbated by income and wealth inequality, as the
JAMA and APM studies also found that in low income counties, those with substianitally
non-white populations had a death rate that was nine times greater thant that of counties with
substantially white populations.35 As shown by the numbers, racial and ethnic minorities groups
are at a much higher risk of getting infected with, becoming hospitalized by, and dying from
COVID-19. The reason for this disproportionate health impact on people of color is because of
inequities in social determinants of health such as discrimination, health care access, occupation,
housing, income level, and wealth gaps.
Unfortunately, discrimination is very prevealent in systems that are meant to protect our
wellbeing and health such as health care, housing and education. Racial discrimination in these
systems places many people from marginalized racial and ethnic groups at an increased risk of
contracting COVID-19 simply by virtue of placing them into conditions that are less than ideal
for weathering a global pandemic. For example, in terms of healthcare access and utilization,
people from marginalized racial and ethnic minority groups are less likely to have health
insurance than white people.36 Limitations to healthcare access could be due to a plethora of
reasons such as lack of transportation, language barriers, and discrimination in healthcare
systems. Because people of color lack access to health care systems, if they contract a case of
COVID-19 that produces complications that threaten their health, they do not have the same
34

Ibid.
Samrachana Adhikari et al., "Assessment of Community-Level Disparities in Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) Infections and Deaths in Large US Metropolitan Areas," JAMA Network Open, July 28, 2020,
doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.16938)
36
"Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups," Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, April 19, 2021, accessed April 22, 2021,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html)
35

Pompilio 23
capabilities as white people to seek treatment, which leads to higher rates of hospitalizations and
deaths. As shown in Figure 2, people of color also have higher rates of infection than white
people. One of the reasons for this is occupation. According to the CDC and as shown in Figure
337, people from racial and ethnic minority groups are disproportionately represented in essential
work settings such as farms, factories, grocery stores, and public transportation.38 The people
who work in these settings have a much higher chance of coming into contact with the
coronavirus than individuals who are able to work remotely and/or have paid sick days. This is
because in-person essential workers, who again are disproportionately people of color, have to
come into close contact with other workers or the public in order to do their jobs. Increased
contact with others in essential worker positions or the public leads to a higher chance of
contracting the virus. Then, when these essential workers return to their homes and see their
roommates or families, their household members are placed at an increased risk of exposure to
COVID-19 as well. Housing is also another reason why the health of people of color is
disproportionately affected by this virus. According to the CDC, many people from racial and
ethnic minority groups live in crowded conditions that make it more difficult to follow
prevention strategies such as social distancing and isolation.39 It is much easier to follow
prevention strategies in spacious living conditions, such as a house, than in a crowded apartment
with multiple people sharing living spaces such as bedrooms and bathrooms. Additionally, low
income individuals also face a greater risk of coming into contact with COVID-19 because they
most often cannot afford to miss a day of work, even if they are sick themselves.40 Low income
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individuals are unable to take a day off of work because they likely are living paycheck to
paycheck, and do not have enough money saved up for essential items like food, utilities, and
other living necessities. Additionally, they have a greater risk of COVID infection because in
order to get to these jobs they must travel, often on public transportation where they come into
close contact with even more people. Income and wealth levels are lower, and poverty is most
acute among Blacks and Latinxs. About 21 percent of Black people and 18 percent of Latinx
people live under the poverty line, compared with eight percent of white people. The median
white household has 41 times more wealth (measured as the sum of assets held by a family
minus total household debt) than the median Black family and 22 times more than the median
Latinx family. Recessions and economic crises in the past have disproportionately affected Black
and Latinx families because they have fewer financial resources to fall back on. The COVID-19
crisis is no different. Due to the lack of resources to prepare and protect against coronavirus, the
poor (disproportionately Black Americans and Latinx Americans) face a higher risk of
contracting and subsequently spreading the virus.
To begin to address the disproportionate health challenges faced by Black, Indigenous,
and People of Color (BIPOC) in this pandemic, the federal government needs to provide targeted
medical assistance to the communities most highly impacted. Federal aid should include
increasing testing locations and materials, in addition to aid, albeit financial or material, to
hospitals in order to help combat this deadly virus. The virus will continue to ravish marginalized
communities if the government does not become more proactive in its response to outbreaks.

Socio-Economic
To limit these health effects and work to slow the spread of the coronavirus, state and
local governments, under guidance from the federal government, implemented stay-at-home
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orders, mandatory two week quarantines, and social distancing precautions in public spaces.
While these mandates were essential to stopping the spread of the coronavirus, these COVID
prevention strategies had a major negative economic and socioeconomic impact that
disproportionately affected people of color and low income families. As mentioned in the section
describing the disproportionate health effects of the coronavirus, many jobs can not be completed
remotely, and do not offer benefits such as paid sick leave or health insurance. Additionally,
many of the lockdown and slow reopening restrictions have led to a sharp decrease for
businesses such as restaurants. Two of the industries most affected by the coronavirus pandemic
are leisure facilities and restaurants.41 Because of virus prevention spread restrictions, sudden
supply and demand shocks to these industries negatively impact the employees of businesses in
these suffering industries causing an increase in unemployment rates and loss of income. For
example, total employment in food preparation and serving occupations fell by 44.3% between
February and May 2020.42 Additionally, even pre-pandemic employment in these occupations are
on average the lowest paid in the United States.43 According to a study done by researchers at the
University of Chicago, workers with the lowest wages in the US have the highest rate of
pandemic job losses.44 As shown in Figure 445, the lowest income group had the highest job loss
rate between February 1, 2020 and the end of June, while the highest-income workers had the
41
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lowest job loss rate during this period. These job losses have disproportionately affected people
of color. Despite the fact that people of color make up a disproportionate share of essential
workers who had to remain in their high-risk of infection jobs, Black and Latinx workers are
much more likely to lose their jobs during the pandemic than white workers. As shown in Figure
546, Black and Latinx unemployment rates remain much higher than white unemployment rates
and the national average unemployment rate consistently. Despite some improvement, Black and
Latinx unemployment rates continue to remain disproportionately high throughout the duration
of this pandemic.
As of July 2020, nearly 50 million Americans had filed for unemployment insurance.
Between March and July, unemployment rates fluctuated between 11.1 percent and 14.4 percent.
By comparison, unemployment peaked at 10.7 percent during the Great Recession.47 Statistics
from April 2020 show that 61 percent of Latinx Americans and 44 percent of Black Americans
said that they, or someone in their household, had experienced a job or wage loss due to the
coronavirus outbreak, compared with 38 percent of white Americans. The economic recession
due to COVID-19, in addition to job and wage loss, has magnified and accelerated the
pre-existing housing crisis. Almost a third of the American people (31%) say that they have
experienced issues paying rent or mortgage, for food and utilities, credit card bills, medical costs
as a result of the pandemic. As shown in Figure 6, this number jumps to 46 percent among Black
Americans and 48 percent among Latinx Americans. 48 Those who cannot afford to pay rent or
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their mortgage are at an extremely high risk of being evicted from their homes, especially
because of the financial strain placed on landlords during this pandemic. 19 to 23 million renters
in the United States were at risk of eviction through the end of 2020, which represents up to 21
percent of households in the US. Despite a range of efforts in different states, the US
government has done little to alleviate the threat of evictions among BIPOC and low income
Americans in the United States, and temporary eviction moratoriums have largely expired across
the US.
The federal government needs to provide appropriately targeted aid to renting families, in
addition to extending eviction moratoriums until the pandemic passes and/or the economy begins
to recover and unemployment rates decline. The federal government will also need to provide
some sort of assistance to landlords, so that they do not face financial ruin as a result of this
process. Regardless of rental payments, properties need to be maintained and ignoring the plight
of landlords, especially individuals and small businesses, will lead to deterioration of the quality
of the living conditions of low income renters and BIPOC renters.
The coronavirus is both a health and socioeconomic crisis that disproportionately affects
low income Americans and BIPOC. Native, Black, and Latinx Americans are more likely to be
hospitalized, infected, and die from the coronavirus than white Americans. Additionally, these
same groups of marginalized individuals are also more likely to be laid off, lose their incomes,
lack access to healthcare, and face evictions. While the coronavirus pandemic has been a hard
time for most Americans, low income people and BIPOC, as Robert Bullard describes, “often
feel the pain of [disastrous] events first, worst, and longest.”49 The disproportionate impact of
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natural disasters, and in this case the coronavirus pandemic, is the direct result of off center
policymaking in our federal government. Government inaction to addressing the needs of the
people, especially of those disproportionately affected, clearly outlines and exacerbates existing
inequalities that were created by past government action and/or inaction such as redlining, and
the erosion of social welfare programs to afford tax cuts for the wealthier portion of the
American population.

Public Opinion on COVID-19 Relief
To begin to address the crisis that is the coronavirus pandemic, our representatives in
government need to get a sense of what the people are feeling, thinking, and experiencing during
these unprecedented times. COVID-19 has affected nearly every American in some way,
however, as stated above, the negative health and socioeconomic effects of the coronavirus
pandemic have been and still are disproportionately affecting low income individuals and people
of color. Since the beginning of this pandemic, despite its dramatically different consequences
for different communities, Americans across the ideological spectrum, of different races,
genders, and income levels have been consistently and almost uniformly calling on their
representatives for one common goal: more relief. The dramatic impact of COVID-19 on
American society has a profound impact on how Americans think about the role of government
and the necessity of relief. American political culture places an emphasis on self-reliance and
pulling oneself up by their bootstraps in times of hardship or crisis. However, when the federal
and state governments are issuing stay at home orders and tell the people they should rely on the
government for assistance and relief, these old arguments about self reliance become moot. To
observe and analyze public opinion about federal COVID-19 relief, I collected ten polls about
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government assistance packages from seven polling organizations over the past twelve months.
Table 1 has a chronological list of the polls used in this study.
In the spring of 2020 when the pandemic began to affect “normal” American life through
talks of a two week quarantine, and an exponentially rising number of confirmed coronavirus
cases and deaths, public opinion indicated strong support for the passing of socioeconomic relief
legislation. Table 2 and Figure 7 shows the results of seven surveys over a twelve month time
period about public support for coronavirus relief aid. Public opinion has consistently indicated
strong support for the passing of federal socio-economic relief legislation. According to a poll
conducted in April of 2020 by the CNBC All America Economic Survey, the American public
was largely in favor of passing the March 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act, with support at approximately 67 percent. When the CARES Act passed,
lawmakers and many American citizens were under the impression that the pandemic would only
last a few weeks or months, and consequently that relief would only be needed for a short period
of time. Once scientists, lawmakers, and citizens learned that the virus was not going away any
time soon, the American people made calls for more socioeconomic relief. As shown in columns
2-5, Pew Research Center conducted a series of polls from April 2020 to January 2021,
monitoring the support of the American people for additional relief. The American people
expressed consistent support for additional COVID relief months after the CARES Act was
passed. From April 2020 to January 2021, support for additional COVID relief remained steady,
with overwhelming support for another economic assistance package peaking at 80 percent, and
never dipping below 71 percent. Additionally, further polling done by the Pew Research Center
and Politico/Morning Consult in March 2021. The poll done by Pew found that 70 percent of
U.S. adults support the Biden administration’s $1.9 trillion relief plan, while only 28 percent
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oppose it. Additionally, Politico/Morning Consult’s survey found that 75 percent of Americans
either strongly, or somewhat support the $1.9 trillion plan. As shown in the results of these
surveys, support for government relief, either in general or for a specific package or program,
was high, averaging 74.14% across seven surveys conducted over the span of twelve months.
During this time period, the government enacted 2 major relief packages with additional
legislation to expand these packages, that did not diminish public support for relief in any way.
Because such a large majority of the population has consistently supported additional
economic assistance, we can infer that support for COVID-relief is not a partisan issue among
the American people. While Republicans and Democrats disagree on most issues, there was, and
still is, strong bipartisan support for government economic assistance. Table 3 and Figure 8 show
the results of four surveys from three organizations over an eight month time period about
partisan support for coronavirus relief aid. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 8, though
Republicans are not as strongly in agreement about the passing of relief as the Democrats, there
is very strong, majority support for more relief on both sides of the aisle, ranging from general
support for economic assistance, to support for specific legislation and policies. Democratic
support for government economic assistance averages at 90 percent over the past eight months,
while Republican support averages at 57.25 percent over the same time periods. It should also be
noted that the dip below Republican majority support in the March 2021 Pew Research poll is
likely due to the phrasing of the survey question, as shown in Table 1, which specifically links
economic assistance to the Biden administration rather than the general federal government.
While there is a partisan gap, with Democrats favoring relief more than Republicans, we can still
argue that bipartisan support for more economic assistance from the federal government is robust
as the majorities of members of both parties indicated their support for more relief in the surveys.
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The difference in support between Republicans and Democrats can also reflect fundamental
partisan beliefs about the role of government (small government vs. big government) as well as
the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on different races, as BIPOC tend to associate with the
Democratic party over the Republican party. Again, despite these slight differences, support for
economic relief was clearly demonstrated consistently across the political aisle.
Given the major economic impact, health impact, and suffering caused by the coronavirus
crisis, it is unsurprising that there is so much support for additional relief from the public. The
American people and economy are hurting. At the time of this writing, over 530 thousand
Americans had died from COVID with the death toll still steadily rising despite vaccine rollouts.
Families are being evicted from their homes, beloved small businesses are being forced to shut
down, and millions have lost their jobs and health care. Though some are more affected than
others, Americans, regardless of party affiliation, are desperate for government relief. In our
increasingly polarized environment it is difficult to remember a time where the people expressed
such a high degree of bipartisan support for federal legislation. Despite partisan divisiveness,
support for coronavirus relief aid remains strong and consistent across party lines and political
ideologies. However, bipartisan support for more relief might not reflect partisan differences on
how to respond to this crisis, who is most deserving of federal economic assistance, and about
the larger role of the federal government. Calls for relief can have many different meanings,
depending on which individuals and/or industries are prioritized. Table 4 provides an insight into
how, where, and to whom the American people believed federal economic relief should be
distributed. In April 2020, a month after the CARES Act was passed, CNBC conducted a public
opinion poll asking Americans to rate which industries and types of businesses deserved the most
federal financial support. As indicated in the results of the poll, and as shown in column 1 of
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Table 4, the American public strongly favored that federal economic relief be directed to
healthcare centers, small businesses and other local entities. Americans believed that hospitals,
small businesses, and non-chain restaurants should be a high priority for economic relief
assistance from the federal government. Notably, Americans ranked large, already wealthy
corporations and organizations, such as oil and gas companies and large banks, at the bottom of
the priority list, along with companies in the tourism and recreational activities businesses, such
as casinos and cruise companies. Americans clearly indicated that economic assistance from a
federal COVID relief package should prioritize hospitals and health services, as well as
individually owned, otherwise known as “Mom and Pop,” smaller, non-chain companies and
businesses.
Americans, however, were not only concerned about the salvation of small companies
and businesses. COVID-19 has affected most Americans on an individual level as well.
Therefore, there are concerns about what further federal economic relief can be provided to the
individual, in addition to relief provided to companies and businesses. This individual level relief
can come in various formats such as stimulus checks, rent and mortgage relief, increased
unemployment benefits, etc. In January 2021, The Hill conducted a nationwide poll to determine
what kind of relief should be prioritized and to whom it should go to. The results of the poll are
presented in column 2 of table 4. The poll found that 54 percent of registered voters said direct
payments were one of the top three most important measures for the next economic assistance
package. The other top two priorities included money for small businesses as well as COVID-19
testing and vaccines. Additionally, other popular issues include rent relief, mortgage relief,
unemployment benefits, and foreclosure and eviction moratoriums. The Hill also found that
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support for stimulus checks was popular across party lines, as 60 percent of Democrats placed it
as one of their top three priorities, while 49 percent of Republicans placed it in theirs.
From the results of the public opinion polls, we can conclude that, not only do the
American people agree that there should be more COVID relief in general, but that there is also a
consensus among the general public on which individuals and industries should receive
economic assistance. The American public was of a singular mind about what exactly they
wanted from the government. The people strongly supported government action in every
phrasing of question about relief for a year, with a consistently strong bipartisan consensus
despite some difference between Republicans and Democrats. Unlike in the case of the 2001
Bush tax cuts where policymakers were able to shape public opinion50, the lived experiences and
struggles of the American public throughout this pandemic have overwhelmingly shaped public
opinion to support common goals that help ordinary Americans. The people want money to go to
individuals, small businesses, medical centers and resources dedicated to defeating the virus, and
placed policies to help large businesses at the bottom of the priority list. One might assume that
because the American people were so clear and unified about to whom, what, and where they
wanted federal economic assistance to go to, Congress’s job in organizing and distributing funds
to individuals and industries would be fairly easy. As we have seen in recent months, this
assumption is inaccurate. Members and leaders in Congress, President Biden, former President
Trump, and members of their respective cabinets were engaged in discussion, debate, and
negotiations for months and months. Because the United States is a representative democracy,
one could infer that, because public opinion indicates overwhelming support for relief such as
stimulus checks for individuals and aid to small businesses, our representatives on both sides of
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the aisle would have a fairly easy time coming to a compromise on COVID relief. This, however,
is not the case. Government action is needed to remedy the disproportionate effects and
inequality that has resulted from and been revealed by this pandemic. The American public knew
what they needed and wanted from the federal government. Despite some effort, the people
largely did not get what they asked for. Our democratic system failed millions of Americans, as
off center policymaking pushed forward and implemented policies that worked directly against
the people’s needs to benefit a small minority of wealthy Americans and large businesses.

An Overview of the CARES Act
In March 2021, Democrats in Congress passed another $1.9 trillion stimulus package
with no Republican support in the Senate. It has been almost one year since the first coronavirus
relief aid bill was passed and signed into law by former-President Trump. Therefore, we must
take the time to understand and analyze the components of these different pieces of legislation, to
see how the government actually decided to divide up economic relief and if our representatives
listened to the will of the people, or if they were influenced by other factors such as money from
large corporations and wealthy private interest groups. Figure 9 provides a clear timeline of when
all major COVID-19 legislation was passed by the Congress and signed into law by either
President Trump or President Biden. One of the largest, most significant pieces of legislation was
the $2.2 trillion CARES Act. The CARES Act was the federal government’s first large relief and
recovery response to the harmful effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The legislation comprises
five key components. The first part of the CARES Act provided for direct payments to taxpayers
from the government, also known as “stimulus checks.” Individuals were paid $1,200 by the
federal government and received an additional $500 for any dependents under the age of 17. The
second component of the CARES Act was the expansion of unemployment benefits.
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Unemployment insurance was expanded to include an additional $600 per week payment to each
recipient for up to 4 months. Further, unemployment benefits were expanded to extend jobless
insurance by 13 weeks. Unemployment insurance was also expanded to cover self-employed
individuals and furloughed employees. The third component of the CARES Act provided for
emergency loans to small businesses who kept their workers on payroll. According to language
in the bill, the CARES act provided federally guaranteed loans available at community banks to
small businesses that pledged to not lay off their workers. This component of the CARES Act
was later expanded in December 2020 when Congress passed the Economic Aid to Hard-Hit
Small Businesses, Nonprofits and Venues Act, consequently expanding the Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP).51 The fourth component of the stimulus package comprised loans and bailouts
for struggling companies with a $425 billion fund controlled by the Federal Reserve, and an
additional $75 billion reserved for industry specific loans. Finally, the fifth component of the
stimulus package was to provide aid to hospitals that were strained due to the coronavirus. The
CARES act included $100 billion for hospitals across the United States, as well as Medicare
payment increases to hospitals and providers.
From what was just described as the five key components of the CARES act, it seemed
that Congress was successful in listening to and understanding the will of the people, and
delivering legislation that directly addressed their demands. As previously shown in Table 4,
Americans indicated that they prioritized aid to small businesses and hospitals. The third and
fifth components of the CARES stimulus package, respectively, addressed that. As also indicated
in Table 4, Americans prioritized stimulus checks and increased unemployment benefits, and the
first and second components of the CARES Act addressed that. While the CARES act did
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generally appear to address the concerns of the American people, it was imperative that the
federal government follow through on these promises during the implementation of the CARES
Act’s new policies and distribution of federal funds. Unfortunately, the implementation of the
CARES act revealed that our representatives in Congress, in particular Republican
representatives, were not working to the benefit of the people, but rather that of wealthy donors
and large corporations. Despite the public health and economic crises happening because of the
coronavirus, Republicans were using the COVID-19 pandemic to further their agenda of
benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the working class. Broadly, the $2 trillion CARES Act
contained tax provisions, pushed by the Trump Administration and Republicans, to provide
millionaires with more tax benefits, in addition to the tax cuts they received in 2017 (The Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017). Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation found that 83 percent of the
tax benefits included in the CARES Act will benefit those making more than a million dollars a
year. Provisions in the bill allow businesses who will take huge losses this year to use those
losses to offset their taxable income and their tax obligation in other years. The CARES Act also
includes a payroll tax delay for employers that takes away a key source of revenue from social
programs many ordinary Amercians depend on such as Social Security and Medicare. The
payroll tax delay allows companies to pay their 2020 payroll taxes through the end of 2022.
Ordinary Americans dependent on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, that are more
severely financially, socially, and medically impacted by the coronavirus pandemic, can ill afford
further cuts to benefits on which their lives literally depend. Cuts to funding in Social Security
and Medicare greatly limit opportunities for ordinary Americans to recover from this crisis.
Ultimately, the design and implementation of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) was also
skewed to benefit America’s top 1 percent.
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The Paycheck Protection Program
The Paycheck Protection Program provision of the CARES Act was purportedly intended
to provide economic relief to small businesses via loans issued by banks from the federal
government. PPP loans were to be distributed through private banks by the federal government
to employers with less than 500 employees and would be forgiven under certain conditions such
as having been used for spending on payroll, utilities, or rent within a specific time period.52
From the period of March 2020 to December 2020, the total cost of the Paycheck Protection
Program to the federal government has been $972 billion. When the program was established in
March 2020, the federal government allocated $349 billion. These funds quickly ran out, and
were replenished by the $321 billion allocated to the PPP in the Paycheck Protection Program
and Health Care Enhancement Act of April 2020 and also by the $302 billion provided in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of December 2020. 53 The Paycheck Protection Program is
administered and implemented by the US government’s Small Business Administration (SBA)
under the guidance of the US Department of the Treasury.
Small businesses in the United States are in crisis. As a result of the pandemic, millions
of small businesses across the country are being forced to permanently close their doors, which
has contributed to the record number of unemployment claims that we have seen in 2020.54
Those lucky enough to have remained open and in business are slowly seeing their revenues dry
up. For many small businesses it is only a matter of time before they will no longer be able to
keep up with operating costs and will be forced to close their doors as well. Without economic
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assistance from the federal government, it is very likely that a large portion of small businesses
in the United States cannot and will not survive until normal/pre-pandemic operations resume. A
poll conducted by Forbes in February 2021 found that one third of small businesses in the United
States expected that they would not survive without further financial assistance from the
government.55 Therefore, federal economic assistance such as the Paycheck Protection Program
is desperately needed by small businesses.

Public Opinion on Relief for Businesses
As previously discussed, the American public expressed strong bipartisan support for
federal economic relief assistance. They also expressed preferences for the sectors of the
economy to which the relief money should be distributed. As shown in Table 4, public opinion
polls conducted by The Hill and CNBC indicate strong public support for the federal government
providing relief to small businesses and individuals. In the April 2020 CNBC poll, small
businesses received a mean rating of 8.2 on a scale of 1-10 when voters ranked their priorities for
economic assistance. In the January 2021 Hill poll, small businesses were also ranked among the
top three priorities for federal economic assistance. In addition to this strong support, the public
also showed a strong opposition to prioritizing large corporations in the federal economic relief
efforts. In the CNBC poll, large corporations such as Boeing, cruise companies, oil and gas
companies and chain restaurants, among others, were ranked between 5.9 and 2.3 on a scale of
1-10. Additionally, “big businesses” were ranked among the top three priorities for relief for only
8 percent of all survey respondents. If our representatives in the federal government are listening
to their constituents, then it is obvious that small businesses should be prioritized over large,
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wealthy corporations when targeting economic relief assistance to help keep businesses alive and
healthy. Therefore, when designing, implementing, and updating the Paycheck Protection
Program over the last year, our government officials, if engaging in centered policy making,
would have made sure that small businesses were ranked as the highest priority when distributing
relief funds.

Creating the Paycheck Protection Program
When the CARES Act passed in Congress, it was hailed as one of the most bipartisan
bills of all time. The bill was passed unanimously in the Senate with a Yea-Nay vote of 96-0,
with 4 Republican senators missing the vote because they were in isolation due to COVID.56
Republican and Democratic leaders were proud of their abilities to compromise, and create such
a massive, critical bill in such a short period of time when the American people were in dire need
of economic assistance. Our representatives were especially proud of their ability to aid small
businesses in need so that we could maintain a healthy, functioning economy. When (then)
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and (then) Senate Minority Leader Chuck
Schumer (D-NY) announced the passage of the CARES Act on the floor of the Senate on March
24, 2020, they both emphasized the prioritization of federal economic assistance to small
businesses in the relief package. McConnell listed “hundreds of billions of dollars in emergency
loans so more small businesses can survive and keep paying their workers” as one of his “four
big priorities” going into the CARES Act negotiations. 57 Additionally, Schumer emphasized the
bill’s ability to provide “real help” to small businesses. He said that “[small business people] will
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get loans, their employees will be paid by the federal government while they are closed and they
could bounce back afterwards.”58 Despite these promising words from the nation’s party leaders,
the provision of the CARES Act that was created to help small businesses during the pandemic,
was not very effective in achieving this goal. In fact, rather than helping small businesses, the
Paycheck Protection Program allocated most of its funding to large companies, many of which
did not fit the qualifications for PPP loans, at the expense of the individual taxpayer and those
small businesses that it was supposed to rescue.

Following the Money: Inequitable Distribution of PPP Loans
According to data released in December 2020 by the Small Business Administration,
large amounts of PPP loans were being distributed to larger corporations rather than into the
hands of small business owners struggling to keep their businesses afloat. As of December 2020,
of the 5.2 million of the program’s borrowers, a mere 1 percent (those seeking $1.4 million and
above) received over a quarter of the total $523 billion disbursed.59 As shown in Figure 10, a
very small number of high value loans accounted for a significant portion of the total PPP money
disbursed so far, about 1 percent of all loans disbursed were for $1.5 million or more, yet loans
over $1.5 million made up over 25 percent of the total disbursements. Despite this uneven
distribution, the Treasury Department and Small Business Administration officials under the
Republican administration have argued that the Paycheck Protection Program worked to
primarily benefit small businesses because more than 87 percent of loans were less $150,000 as
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of August 2020. 60 However, the data on 5 million PPP loans distributed by December 2020
revealed that more than half of the $523 billion of total PPP funds went to large businesses,
while only 28 percent of the money was distributed in amounts less than $150,000.61 Upon
further investigation, researchers from the Washington Post found that the 5 percent of the loans
made accounted for more than half of all loan value.62 The distribution of these loans that were
meant for small businesses mirrors the extreme inequality perpetuated by unequal wealth
distribution in the United States, with the top 0.1 percent of Americans having approximately the
same amount of wealth as the entire bottom 90 percent. Among the large corporations that
received the maximum loan of $10 million are the large restaurant chains, TGI Fridays, P.F.
Chang’s, Black Angus Steakhouse, and Legal Sea Foods; who all took advantage of an exception
for which the restaurant industry lobbied to make chains eligible for the aid money. In Saratoga
Springs, the New York Racing Association, which operates the Saratoga Race Course and
already benefits from generous subsidies from New York State, also received the maximum loan
of $10 million.63 These data indicate that the PPP primarily benefited the well-banked,
well-lawyered, and well-connected companies at the expense of small businesses who so
desperately needed these loans. Even when small businesses were able to secure some funding
from the program, it often was not nearly enough to sustain the costs of operation, as the ongoing
pandemic and lack of individual stimulus payments made it more and more difficult for
businesses to keep their doors open, forcing many small business owners to go bankrupt. While
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the PPP money has helped some small businesses, as Senators McConnell and Schumer said it
would and, as public opinion had indicated was a top priority, the large scale distribution of the
PPP loans show an uneven, disproportionate skew towards helping larger, well connected
companies rather than small businesses. For many of the small businesses that did receive
funding, it was not nearly enough to sustain business operations for the duration of this still
ongoing pandemic. How could this have happened? If both Democrats and Republicans
expressed support for aid to small businesses, why did such a large portion of the money go to
large, wealthy corporations? The answer: off center policymaking.

Off Center Paycheck Protection Program Policymaking
As described by McConnell and Schumer, and as indicated in the language of the CARES
Act,64 the PPP was originally devised as a way to pay small companies with less than 500
employees to keep their employees on payroll for eight weeks. Despite these parameters, rollout
of the program was messy and filled with confusion over vague rules and limitations on
borrowers set by then Republican controlled agencies charged with its administration. These
vague rules and regulations set the tone for the uneven distribution of funds to be paid out under
the PPP. The confusion over rules for borrowers and an early run on the money by large chains
and banks via knowledge of the existing system and other advantageous business connections,
caused the first pot of funding to “run dry” in just thirteen days.65 Within two weeks of the PPP
rollout in early April 2020, the program reached its $349 billion cap, with most of the money
allocated to large corporations.66 It should be noted that the Paycheck Protection Program and the
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CARES Act under which it was created was an emergency bill that was hastily written,
negotiated, rewritten and eventually agreed upon as an emergency bill. It would be nearly
impossible and unrealistic to work out every single kink and detail in every program in every
provision of the bill in such a short amount of time. However, leaders in Congress were given
this opportunity just a week into the implementation of the PPP, amidst calls for more funding
for the program that was quickly running out of money. Both Republicans and Democrats agreed
that the high demand for PPP loans was positive, because it indicated strong interest in the
program by the people. However, conflict on the Senate floor about how to move forward with
the program revealed the priorities of each party when dealing with aid to small businesses
versus large corporations. On April 9, 2020, Majority Leader McConnell requested that the
Senate pass additional funding for the PPP by unanimous consent. He called for an additional
$250 billion to be added to the already agreed upon PPP provision of the CARES Act. This was
a contentious move by McConnell, as Democratic leadership, including Senator Schumer and
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, had realized that most of the money in the PPP was flowing to
larger corporations rather than small businesses. Democrats wanted to change language in the
bill to ensure federal dollars went to small businesses via grant programs, where it was more
urgently needed. Survey data provided by the SBA found that in the first week of the
implementation of the PPP, approximately 57 percent of lenders did not process PPP loans on a
“first come, first serve” basis as required by the SBA, and instead prioritized larger businesses
with whom they had already established relationships.67
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On the Senate floor on April 9, 2020, Senator Ben Cardin (D- MD) objected to Senator
McConnell’s request for additional funding for PPP by unanimous consent. Senator Cardin
argued against McConnell’s request by advocating for more funding for emergency grant
programs offered by the SBA so that small businesses could obtain federal funds without having
to have a prior relationship with a commercial bank.68 Senator Cardin stressed the difficulties for
small businesses of obtaining PPP loans from banks that all had different rules, parameters, and
capabilities for lending which created barriers for them to obtain loans that larger, well
established companies did not face. Cardin also stressed the importance of getting loans to
underserved communities, which McConnell’s request for unanimous consent of approval for
more funds failed to address.69 Rather than just continuing to fund the PPP as is, Democrats also
were advocating for changes to the program to include money for hospitals, state and local
governments, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits and
community-based financial institutions that had been unable to participate in PPP. Republicans
argued that the program should be left as is.

Crafted Talk
On the Senate floor, Senator McConnell labeled the attempt of the Democrats to disperse
PPP funding more equitably to smaller businesses as “hyper partisan political maneuvering” that
was going to “literally cost Americans their jobs.” McConnell said,
We’re asking small business owners across America to keep workers on payroll
because Congress, the Treasury, and the SBA will have their back. We must not
fail them. My colleagues must not treat working Americans as political hostages,
68
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This does not have to be, nor should it be, contentious. We don’t have to divide
along the usual lines so soon after we came together for the country. To my
Democratic colleagues, please please do not block emergency aid you do not even
oppose just because you want something more….We cannot play games in this
crisis. Let’s pass more non controversial funding for American’s paychecks. Let’s
do it today and then let’s continue to work together with speed and bipartisanship.
We will get through this crisis together.70
In this speech, McConnell’s message to the public is that the Democrats were playing partisan
political games at the expense of the individual taxpayer and small business owners. He used
language such as “political hostages” and accused Democrats of playing games while trying to
solve this crisis. McConnell argued that his ask was simple: just add more funding to the already
agreed upon bill. While McConnell’s argument was straight forward, it completely missed the
mark. As explained above, the PPP was not working in favor of small businesses. Simply adding
more funding to the program would not do anything to help the people who most needed it.
McConnell said that Democratic objection to his request for unanimous consent approval for
more funding was costing Americans their jobs. The reality of the situation was, additional
funding or not, small businesses were being forced to lay off their workers. They were not
getting, nor would they be able to get PPP loans regardless of how much more money was
pumped into the program, because without any changes to legislation, large, well connected
companies would continue to be able to obtain loans from banks much quicker and easier than
small businesses applying for loans the first time. Both Democrats and Republicans were aware
of how these loans were being distributed. McConnell’s accusations of Democratic
hyperpartisanship and holding the paychecks of the American people hostage is an example of
crafted talk used in off center policymaking. McConnell and other Republicans did not want to
change the PPP program to make it more accessible to small businesses because it was working
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perfectly for their wealthy donor base. Large companies were getting large sums of money from
banks with which they already had relationships, in a very short amount of time. To maintain this
accessibility of loans for large corporations, McConnell and other Republicans, as seen in
McConnell’s speech on the Senate floor, use crafted language to shift the blame of why small
businesses are not receiving loans onto the Democrats, for allegedly stalling desperately needed
funding in order to push through a contentious partisan agenda that would be unlikely to be
passed. Another example of crafted talk about the PPP was from Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL)
who also served as the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship. In a letter to Jovita Carranza, Administrator of the U.S. Small Business
Administration and Steven Mnunchin, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Rubio
accuses congressional Democrats of “holding up new funds for PPP, putting the livelihood of
millions of Americans at risk.” 71 He wrote that he was confident that the American people “will
not tolerate this inexcusable Washington charade and Congress will agree to increased funding
for PPP in the near future.” 72 Like Senator McConnell, Senator Rubio placed the blame of the
shortcomings of the PPP for small businesses on Democrats, when, in actuality, it was the
Democrats who were advocating for rule changes to make the program more accessible for small
businesses.
Democrats and Republicans did not reach a deal until weeks later on April 21, 2020 when
Congress passed the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act. In
addition to $321 billion in funding to replenish the Paycheck Protection Program, Democrats
were able to negotiate an additional $50 billion for the Disaster Loans Program and $10 billion
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for the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) grants.73 Unlike PPP loans, loans distributed by
the Disaster Loans Program and EIDL are handled directly by the government rather than private
lenders, which makes obtaining loans easier for small business owners who do not have deep
banking industry connections.74 The Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care
Enhancement Act did not change any language regarding making the PPP more accessible for
small businesses, aside from $60 billion set aside for small and midsize community lenders.75
Despite these efforts to expand access to small businesses, specifically in underserved
communities, businesses applying for PPP loans still largely needed to rely on prior relationships
with banks in order to obtain funding.

Skewed Policy Design: Private Lenders Decide Who Gets What
Though additional funding for emergency grants was impactful,76 It quickly ran out of
money and small businesses were still suffering even after the passage of the Paycheck
Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act. As discussed above, a central reason for
the inequitable distribution of relief funding is the responsibility placed on private banks by the
US government to distribute the loans. Private banks, with their own profit motives, targeted
loans to larger businesses with whom they already had relationships, rather than prioritizing
smaller businesses on a first come first serve basis, as required by the SBA. According to SBA
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data from December 2020, lenders collected $18 billion in fees, with the largest payment of $1
billion going to JP Morgan on over 280,000 loans totalling $29 billion. Another large lender,
Bank of America, collected $947 million in fees on approximately 343,400 loans worth $26
billion.77 These loans were most often distributed inequitably, to larger companies at the expense
of small businesses, especially in underserved communities. A study done by Bartik et. al. at the
National Bureau of Economic Research finds that, “Businesses with less cash on hand,
businesses in more affected industries, and businesses reporting more distress due to the crisis
were markedly more likely to apply for PPP loans. However, these applications from distressed
businesses were unlikely to be approved.”78 Because most loans were administered by private
banks, the ability of the government to target funding to areas in need was diminished. Instead of
distributing loans to distressed target areas and businesses, banks relied on pre-existing
relationships between themselves and other businesses to determine which companies and firms
would receive benefits from the PPP program. This reliance on relationships for access to PPP
funds placed small businesses at a disadvantage and made them more likely to have their loan
requests rejected. Bigger companies with substantial cash reserves are more likely to have better
relationships with their banks, which has allowed them access to more money via PPP loans.
This occurred even though smaller businesses were more severely impacted financially by the
COVID pandemic. According to the same study, businesses that reported themselves as “low
impact firms”, meaning that COVID-19 is “not impacting their business” had their loan requests
approved at a much higher rate than high impact firms that reported that “COVID-19 is really
impacting” their business. In another study done at the National Bureau of Economic Research,
Granja et. al. determined that there was no evidence that PPP funds flowed to areas more
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adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic. Rather, funds were
disproportionately allocated to areas least affected by the COVID-19 crisis. Granja et. al. write,
“Fifteen percent of establishments in the regions most affected by declines in hours worked and
business shutdowns received PPP funding; in contrast, thirty percent of all establishments
received PPP funding in the least affected regions.” 79 They argue that this pattern is because of
the heterogeneity in the intensity of PPP participation across lenders. Senator Ben Cardin spoke
about the difficulties of obtaining PPP loans for small businesses who don’t have relationships
with banks. He said,
I’ve heard from small businesses that they went to their bank in order to
participate in a PPP loan and they were told that they didn’t have a credit card so
the bank wasn’t going to write the loan, or they hadn’t had a previous loan with
that bank so the bank is not going to write the loan. We’ve heard from some
community banks that they can only handle existing customers….We’ve got to do
a better job in reaching these underserved communities so that a small business
that doesn’t have that type of relationship with a bank can still participate in the
Paycheck Protection Plan.80
The policy design of the Paycheck Protection Program is the result of off center policymaking,
working to benefit wealthy donors and large corporations who were not impacted as intensely by
the economic consequences of the pandemic. Despite certain provisions argued for by the
Democrats such as funding for disaster relief grants, the implementation of the Paycheck
Protection Program gave banks the privacy and agency to distribute loans inequitably to
companies with pre-pandemic established relationships, rather than to smaller businesses who
had never previously applied for a loan. The failure of Congress to create legislation to
appropriately address this issue ultimately worsened the effects of the pandemic on small
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businesses. Lack of PPP funding to small businesses in addition to a lack of funding to
individuals, forced many small businesses to close and/or declare bankruptcy, all while larger
companies received funding, and banks collected billions of dollars in fees. Those who
benefitted from the PPP were not small businesses and ordinary voters, rather they were large
corporations and their wealthy shareholders. If this policy had been aimed at helping small
businesses, small business owners would not have had to rely on connections with private banks
looking to profit in order to obtain federal funding for their suffering businesses.
More specifically, the small businesses placed at the largest disadvantage in receiving
funding from the Paycheck Protection Program are disproportionately Black-owned. PPP loans
only reached 20 percent of eligible businesses in states with the highest densities of Black owned
businesses, and in counties with the densest Black owned business activity, coverage rates tended
to dip even lower than 20 percent.81 This should be surprising considering that the purpose of the
PPP was purportedly to allocate funds to businesses hurt by the coronavirus pandemic. US
Census Bureau data finds that there is a correlation between Black business density and
Covid-19 incidence. As shown in Figure 11, there is a positive relationship between COVID
incidence and the share of Black owned businesses in a given US county.82 The relationship
between COVID incidence and white owned businesses however, shows an inverse relationship.
The reason for the positive relationship between COVID incidence and Black owned businesses
is because Black business activity is geographically concentrated and correlates with Black
population density, which is typically centered in metropolitan locations that tend to be
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COVID-19 hotspots.83 Based on this determination, we can infer that locations with higher
concentrations of Black-owned businesses are more likely to be facing the socioeconomic effects
of the pandemic. Businesses located in areas with higher COVID-19 infection rates are troubled
with longer mandated closures, higher risks of employees becoming infected with the virus, and
stricter social distancing measures that allow for far fewer customers to enter a business than
prior to the pandemic. Black-owned businesses are also less likely to have strong long term
banking relationships than white owned businesses which, as described above, makes it more
difficult to get approved PPP loans from banks. The United States Federal Reserve System’s
Small Business Credit Survey on Employer Firms found that, “fewer than 1 in 4 Black owned
employer firms has a recent borrowing relationship with a bank” and that, “this number drops to
1 in 10 among Black nonemployer firms, compared with 1 in 4 white-owned nonemployers.”84
Additionally, this gap is not due to differential rates in Black businesses applying for financing,
as survey data indicates that Black businesses applied for financing at equal or higher rates than
white owned firms, but are denied at higher rates than white owned firms.85 Once again, the
outcome of the PPP, as a result of off center policy making, is directly at odds with the needs of
the businesses and people suffering the most from this virus. Rather than addressing
demonstrated need and targeting financial relief toward these businesses, the creation and
implementation of this program by Congress, the SBA, and the Department of Treasury, skews
benefits and funding to businesses with pre-established long term banking relationships.
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Therefore, in terms of addressing the businesses most affected by this virus, in this case
Black-owned businesses, the PPP is largely ineffective as it is not adequately delivering relief to
the people who need it the most. Money going to larger companies is not going to solve the
COVID economic crisis if small businesses around the country are being forced to close because
they do not have strong long term relationships with banks. Additionally, as the result of off
center policymaking of the PPP, inequality is worsened as Black business owners and employees
of these businesses are placed at further socioeconomic disadvantage. If these businesses do not
receive relief funding from the government, they will suffer and in many cases close. Closures
and economic suffering will lead to higher rates in unemployment and a sharp decrease in
income, which perpetuates and worsens income inequality, racial inequality, and inequality of
mobility amongst marginalized individuals such as Black Americans.
Despite the PPP being originally described as a way to pay small companies with less
than 500 employees to keep their employees on payroll for eight weeks, large corporations were
able to obtain millions of dollars in PPP funds via loopholes in PPP legislation and vague
parameters implemented by the SBA and the Department of the Treasury. Large corporations
with thousands of employees in multiple locations were able to apply for individual loans for
separate chain locations, thus allowing them to receive millions of dollars from the PPP. For
example, the restaurant chain Shake Shack employs almost 8,000 people at 189 restaurants with
approximately 45 employees at each location. Under a franchise model, Shake Shack was able to
apply for individual loans for each location, and eventually received a $10 million loan from the
SBA.86 It is important to note that the Treasury Department did ask these large corporations to
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return these loans (and Shake Shack did). However, the agency has yet to disclose specifically
which other large borrowers have chosen to do so. Other technically ineligible companies
received loans despite not meeting SBA requirements. According to an inspection of the SBA’s
Implementation of the Paycheck Protection Program conducted by Hannibal “Mike” Ware, the
SBA Inspector General, data showed that lenders approved more than $402 million in PPP loans
to approximately 5,000 potentially ineligible businesses that did not meet the CARES Act
eligibility requirement of being in operation on or before February 15th 2020.87 Additionally, the
SBA Inspector General found that 355 businesses that exceeded both 500 employees and the
applicable employee-based size standard for the business industry received erroneously approved
PPP loans totaling approximately $856 million. 88 Further, as shown in Table 5, 123 loans
totalling approximately $156 million were made to borrowers that reported 5,000 employees or
more, which is ten times the CARES Act threshold. 89 Funding going to these large, ineligible
companies could have been allocated and targeted to small businesses, especially in underserved
communities. Rather than addressing the demonstrated needs of the people most affected by the
COVID economic crisis by providing money to individuals and small businesses, our elected
officials, the SBA, and the Department of the Treasury provided funding to large corporations
with wealthy shareholders. One could make the argument that it was not entirely the fault of our
representatives, as it was the banks who were in charge of distributing these loans. However, it
was the off center policy written by our representatives in Congress, and implemented by SBA
and Treasury officials appointed by a Republican administration that allowed for these loopholes
to be exploited. The SBA and Mnunchin’s Treasury Department put the banks in charge, failed to
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draft regulations that would ensure the equitable distribution of PPP funds and finally neglected
to hold the banks accountable to properly administer the program. Therefore, the off center
policy utterly failed to protect the interests of the median voter and small businesses.

Political Inaction and Lack of Transparency
There was a significant lack of transparency and oversight on the part of the federal
government when implementing the Paycheck Protection Program. PPP public reporting and
loan level data was inaccurate and incomplete. Without this data, program decisions could not be
appropriately informed, thus limiting the scope and accuracy of the program when distributing
loans to businesses in need. For example, 191,003 loans totaling approximately $11 billion did
not include employment information in the required job field for the number of current
employees.90 More specifically, there was a significant gap in data on underserved markets such
as ethnic code, veteran status, and women owned businesses.91 Because of this missing data, the
SBA will not be able to accurately and completely report to Congress on whether it successfully
reached underserved markets. Additionally, Section 1102 of the CARES Act includes a “Sense of
the Senate” statement that indicates that the SBA administrator should issue guidance to lenders
and agents to “ensure the processing and disbursement of covered loans prioritize underserved
markets, including small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals.”92 The report from the Inspector General found little evidence to
suggest that the SBA issued any guidance to ensure lenders prioritized helping borrowers from
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underserved markets, and the little evidence they did find was released too slowly to have had an
impact.
The lack of oversight and lack of guidance in the implementation of the PPP is once
again the result of off center policy making. However, in this case, it is the inaction taken by the
federal government that perpetuates inequality by increasing benefits for the wealthy and large
corporations at the expense of the ordinary voter and of small businesses in underserved
communities. By not issuing ample guidance to ensure lenders prioritized borrowers from
underserved markets, these potential borrowers suffered at the expense of larger companies in
already well served markets, some of which were not even eligible for PPP loans. In addition to
SBA and Treasury leadership, members of Congress tasked with overseeing the implementation
of the PPP such as Senator Marco Rubio who was Chairman of the Senate Small Business
Committee, should have worked to ensure that the SBA was following the regulations agreed
upon and set forth by the Senate in Section 1102 of the CARES Act. Despite the language in the
legislation, members of Congress such as Senator Rubio engaged in the off center policy making
strategy of policy drift by neglecting to take steps to ensure that the SBA was correctly and
accurately implementing the PPP as outlined in the CARES Act. As a result of this drift, small
business owners in underserved communities suffered, as large companies not nearly as impacted
by the pandemic received millions of loans from banks with which they had previously
established relationships.
Once again, the missing data indicates a strong lack of transparency from the federal
government on the implementation of the PPP. Despite costing the federal government billions of
dollars, the SBA has yet to release any complete data about what companies have received the
loans. Steve Mnunchin, the Secretary of the Treasury, defended the incomplete data, saying, “We
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never agreed to full transparency.”93 He defended this lack of transparency by saying that it
works to protect small businesses because he wanted to make sure that the company names and
loan amounts for very small businesses were not made public so that others would not be able to
tell individuals’ compensation, which would be “unfair.” 94 This message was met with pushback
from key members of the Democratic party, such as House Majority Whip James Clyburn
(D-SC-6), who warned that Mnuchin’s lack of transparency was evidence of a “two tiered”
process that allows loan distributing banks to give priority to wealthier customers.95 House
Democrats even went so far as to write direct letters to major lenders such as JP Morgan, Wells
Fargo, and Bank of America highlighting their concerns about the banks’ diversion of funds to
wealthy clients. Additionally, Marco Rubio flipped his position on transparency from initially
advocating for the release of records on loan recipients to taking the same position as Mnunchin,
claiming that the release of this data would be a violation of “trade secrets” and encourages
poaching of employees.96 This rhetoric was quick to be criticized by Democrats. For example,
Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) tweeted that “It’s absurd that [Mnunchin] believes that he
should hand out more than $500 billion of taxpayers funds in secret.”97 Despite the claims of
Republican leaders that the lack of transparency protects small businesses, the little data that has
been made available indicates that the PPP disproportionately favored wealthy and large
corporations at the expense of small, minority, and female owned businesses. We can infer that
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the motivation for this lack of transparency is not so straightforward, as preventing the release of
loan data protects the interests of the Republican donor base of large corporations by keeping
their PPP loan amounts under wraps. Once again, off center policymaking is to blame for the
lack of requirements for transparency and oversight for the SBA and Treasury’s implementation
of the program, and the bank’s distribution of funds. This distribution of billions of federal
dollars happening outside of public scrutiny made holding the SBA, Mnuchin’s treasury, and
leaders in Congress accountable nearly impossible. Solid accusations of heavily favoring the
wealthy cannot be made without evidence, and Mnuchin and other Republicans’ reluctance to
share PPP loan data is an obstruction of clarity and the ability to hold those in power accountable
for not answering the clearly indicated needs to the people.

Discussion
Mechanisms such as crafted talk, skewed policy benefits for large corporations that are
obscured to look like they benefit small businesses, political inaction, and a lack of transparency
come together to exemplify the off center policymaking in the creation and implementation of
the Paycheck Protection Program. Because the PPP was the cornerstone of the federal economic
relief assistance, we can infer that the values and priorities centered in the Paycheck Protection
Program extend to the rest of the federal government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Further research on off center policymaking in the federal COVID-19 economic relief response
could include case studies on wealthy industries and businesses that received massive bailouts
from the US Department of Treasury such as cruise lines, and airlines companies and lobbyists
such as Boeing.98
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Additionally, it is important to remember that the SBA and Treasury have not disclosed
full sets of data detailing what companies got specific amounts of funding over the past year.
Without this data, it is impossible to know the full extent to which off center Covid relief policy
making took place. As seen in the case of Shake Shack, a large restaurant chain worth $4.55
billion99, returning its massive amount of PPP funding after being publicly called out by the
media, the accountability of private lenders and federal government officials are imperative to
the functionality of the relief response, and the salvation of our economy which rests on the
backs of small businesses when dealing with this crisis.
Because Republicans were in power for the majority of this pandemic (so far), the blame
of off center Covid politics and policymaking is largely centered around key members of the
Republican party. After all is said and done, it was Republicans who made the final decisions on
what and how Covid relief policy was created and implemented. This however, is not to say that
Democrats and ideologically left leaning members of the federal government are incapable of off
center policymaking. After campaigning for months, and despite controlling the House, Senate,
and Presidency, Democrats failed to deliver on promises to increase the federal minimum wage
from $7.25 an hour to $15 an hour.100 Further research on this topic could reveal similar tactics
used by Republicans in response to the COVID relief by Democrats on the issue of minimum
wage.
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Conclusion
The pandemic is far from over. Even with increased vaccine rollouts, another $1,400
stimulus check, and the passing of the Democratic led American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, we
must watch to see if Democrats and the Biden administration learn from mistakes made in the
initial COVID relief response and if they will make changes to the off center policies
implemented as “economic assistance” that actually worked to worsen inequalities in the United
States. The theory of off center policy making is useful when examining and analyzing the
motivations of policymakers when creating and implementing policy. It provides another critical
lens through which we can view the actions of our elected officials and hold them accountable
when they work against the interests of a large group of ordinary Americans to serve a small,
wealthy minority. As seen in the cases of the Bush tax cuts and the Paycheck Protection
Program, policies implemented under the guise of working to help the people must be carefully
scrutinized, and the theory of off center policymaking allows us to do just that. We must examine
all future policies under these same parameters to ensure that our government is working for the
people, so that our democracy, economy, and, in this case of a pandemic, the physical well being
of the people are healthy.
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Figure 6

Table 1
Date

Organization/Institution Questions asked

4/3-6/2020

CNBC All America
Economic Survey

“As you may know, last week Congress and the
president passed the Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act to support the economy
during the coronavirus crisis. From what you have
heard about it, do you favor or oppose this law?”

April 2020

CNBC

“I’m going to read you the names of some industries
and companies. For each one, I’d like to know how
high a priority you think it should be for economic
relief assistance from the federal government. Please
use a scale from zero to ten. A ten means that a
company or industry should be a top priority for
economic relief assistance from the government, and
a zero means it should not be a priority at all. You
may use any number from zero to ten for each item.
And please remember that not every one of them can
be a top priority.”

April 7-12,

Pew Research Center

“As you may know, Congress and President Trump
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2020; June
16-22, 2020;
November
12-17, 2020

passed a $2 trillion economic assistance package in
March in response to the economic impact of the
coronavirus outbreak. Do you think another
economic assistance package is necessary or not
necessary?”

August 3-11, Gallup
2020

“Do you think the federal government should or
should not send another one-time economic impact
payment to all qualified adults (a direct payment to
all qualified U.S. adults based on income level)?”

January
8-12, 2021

Pew Research Center

“As you may know, Congress and President Trump
passed a second major economic assistance package
in December in response to the economic impact of
the coronavirus outbreak. Do you think another
economic assistance package will be necessary or not
necessary?”

January
28-29, 2021

The Hill

“What are the three most important measures that
should be prioritized in the next relief package?”

February
2021

The
Economist/YouGov

Average polled support for bill or executive action

March 1-7,
2021

Pew Research Center

% who they oppose or favor the $1.9 trillion
COVID-19 economic aid package proposed by the
Biden Administration

March 6-8,
2021

Politico/Morning
Consult

“Do you support or oppose the coronavirus aid
package that includes up to $1,400 in direct
payments to some Americans, funding for schools
and local governments and an extension of increased
unemployment benefits?”

Pompilio 65
Table 2
Date

Organization/
Institution

Support (%)

Oppose (%)

Unsure/No
Answer (%)

1

April 3-6, 2020

CNBC All
America
Economic Survey

67

8

25

2

April 7-12, 2020

Pew Research
Center

77

22

1

3

June 16-22, 2020

Pew Research
Center

71

28

19

4

November 12-17,
2020

Pew Research
Center

80

19

1

5

January 8-12, 2021 Pew Research
Center

79

20

1

6

March 1-7, 2021

Pew Research
Center

70

28

2

7

March 6-8, 2021

Politico/Morning
Consult

75

18

6
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Figure 7

Table 3

Date

Institution/Organizati
on

Support (%)

Oppose (%)

August 3-11, 2020

Gallup

82 (D)
64 (R)

9 (D)
24 (R)

Jan 8-12, 2021

Pew Research Center

92 (D)
65 (R)

7 (D)
34 (R)

March 1-7, 2021

Pew Research
Center101

94 (D)
41 (R)

6 (D)
57 (R)

March 6-8, 2021

Politico/Morning

90 (D)

5 (D)

101

"Broad Public Support for Coronavirus Aid Package; Just a Third Say It Spends Too Much," Pew Research
Center U.S. Politics and Policy, March 9, 2021, , accessed April 23, 2021,
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/03/09/broad-public-support-for-coronavirus-aid-package-just-a-third-say
-it-spends-too-much/)

Pompilio 67
Consult102

59 (R)

35 (R)

Figure 8

102

Matt Bracken and Claire Williams, "GOP Lawmakers Say $1.9 Trillion Stimulus Bill Offers Too Much Support.
Most Voters Don’t Agree," Morning Consult, March 10, 2021, accessed April 23, 2021,
https://morningconsult.com/2021/03/10/stimulus-package-support-poll/)
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Table 4
Preferred Uses of Federal Economic Assistance for Covid Relief
1

2

CNBC (mean rating scale 1-10) April 2020

The Hill (%) January 2021

Hospitals
9.1

Stimulus checks
54

Small businesses
8.2

Small businesses
42

Non-chain restaurants
7.0

Covid-19 testing & vaccines
41

Small local banks
6.7

Rent & mortgage relief
34

Retailers
6.2

Increase unemployment benefits
32

Chain restaurants
5.9

Foreclosures & eviction moratorium
25

Airlines
5.2

State & local government
21

Oil and gas companies
5.1

Student debt relief
21

Large U.S. banks
4.9

Big businesses
8

Automobile companies
4.9

Other
2

Boeing
4.7

No more $ needed
7

Cruise companies
3.3
Casinos
2.3
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Figure 9

Figure 10
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Table 5
PPP Loans to Businesses with More than 5,000 Employees
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